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ABSTRACT 
In this article we examine how temporal proximity of an event influences 
decision task processing and, in turn, the likelihood of framing effects. We 
hypothesized that events occurring in the relatively near future should be 
more likely to induce the analytic processing style and result in attenuated 
framing effects. Events occurring in the more distant future should be processed 
with the holistic style and framing effects should be relatively more 
pronounced. In Study 1, we assessed how temporal proximity influenced 
the perceived relevance for an event occurring at different temporal 
proximities. In Study 2, we tested the influence of temporal proximity using 
the Asian disease problem. In Study 3, we tested the influence of temporal 
proximity with a different type of risky–choice decision task and investigated 
evidence for analytic/holistic processing. The results provide 
converging support for a temporal–relevance hypothesis. 
  
Over two decades of research has investigated the finding that 
presentation of alternatives, as positive or negative outcomes, 
will substantially influence a decision–maker’s choice. It stands to 
reason that this change of preference, based solely on presentational 
frame, does not follow a logical or rational course. Rather, 
most people agree that preference for one option over another 
should remain constant regardless of the frame in which the options 
are presented. The most widely investigated example of this 
change in preference has become known as the framing effect. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) first depicted this effect in the 
development of prospect theory. According to prospect theory, 
the value function is not linear and differs for gains and losses as 
depicted in the S–shaped value function. For both gains and 
losses, the value curve is negatively accelerating yielding a concave 
curve for gains and a convex curve for losses. A direct prediction 
from prospect theory is that, when dealing with problems 
that are framed in terms of gains, individuals should tend to be 
relatively risk averse, whereas when the problem is framed in 
terms of losses, they should tend to be risk seeking. It is from this 
prediction that work on framing effects has evolved. 
 
Since the introduction of prospect theory, the framing effect has 
become the most widely tested example of irrational decision– 
making. Although mostly supportive, some research investigating 
framing effects has demonstrated inconsistencies, 
including both null effects and “preference reversals” (see 
Kühberger, 1998 and Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998 for reviews). 
Such inconsistent findings have led researchers to further 
investigate person and situational factors that can influence the 
likelihood of framing. 
 
Research has revealed that contextual factors, such as requests 
for elaboration (Takemura, 1994; LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2003; Miller& 
Fagley, 1991; Sieck & Yates, 1997), context indicators (Bless, 
Betxch, & Franzen, 1998), target of the task (Levin & Chapman, 
1990; Wang, 2001), and presentation format (Fagley & Miller, 
1997) can affect the likelihood of framing. It is also the case that 
person factors such as need for cognition (Chatterjee, Heath, 
Milberg, & France, 2000; Curseu, 2006; Smith & Levin, 1996; 
Zhang & Buda, 1999; Simon, Fagley, & Halleran, 2004), intuition 
(Levin, Gaeth, & Schreiber, 2002), competence (Bruine de Bruin, 
Parker, & Fischoff, 2007), and predispositions toward analytical– 
deliberative thought (Bartels, 2006; LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2003, 
McElroy & Seta, 2003) appear to play a role in processes involved 
in the framing effect. 
 
 
DUAL–PROCESSING APPROACH 
 
Theoretical models of dual–processing have proven effective in 
many areas of research (e.g., Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 
1992; Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Stanovich & West, 
2000) but have proven especially important for social psychology 
(Chaiken & Trope, 1999). At the heart of the dual–processing approach 
lays the belief that processing of information occurs via 
two fundamentally different routes. Normally, one route is considered 
to involve more in–depth processing and the other, less 
in–depth processing. 
 
Research investigating the effects of dual–processing in framing 
tasks has found that different levels of processing have substantially 
different effects on participants’ choices. While there 
are differences in the functionality of the two systems, there is 
general agreement that the “system” the individual relies on 
plays an important role in how the framing task is processed and 
subsequent decisions are made (e.g., Bartels, 2006; Igou & Bless, 
2007; Leny–Meyers & Maheswaran, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd, 
1991; McElroy & Seta, 2003; Wang, 2006) 
 
 
ANALYTIC/HOLISTIC MODEL 
 
According to the analytic/holistic model, two systems of processing 
operate independently and under different principles. The 
model identifies three factors that can determine which processing 
style will be more or less likely to be used. Specifically, research 
investigating the model has demonstrated that relevance 
(McElroy & Seta, 2003; 2006), personality predisposition 
(McElroy & Seta, 2003), and hemispheric activation (Gallagher & 
Dagenbach, 2007; McElroy&Seta, 2004) can all act as determining 
factors for the processing style individuals rely upon. 
 
Although applicable to other decision tasks, research testing 
this model has focused on gaining a better understanding of the 
framing effect. In one study, McElroy and Seta (2003) demonstrated 
that tasks of sufficiently high personal relevance induced 
the more effortful/analytic style, leading to greater numeric sen- 
sitivity and little or no framing influence. Tasks of low personal 
relevance induced the less effortful/holistic processing style, 
leading to heightened sensitivity to contextual cues and greater 
influence of framing. Later research has supported the relevance 
principle of this model (Leny–Meyers & Maheswaran, 2004; 
McElroy & Seta, 2006). 
 
Situational factors also can act to induce either processing style 
via relative hyperactivation of the respective hemispheres. Conditions 
that lead to relative hyperactivation of the left hemisphere 
induce more analytic processing and less framing whereas 
hyperactivation of the right hemisphere induces the holistic processing 
style, leading to relatively stronger framing effects 
(McElroy & Seta, 2004). 
 
Similar to other dual–process models, the analytic/holistic 
model incorporates the effort (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) and personality (e.g., Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, 
&Huh, 1992) principles seen in other dual–process models. However, 
it also includes the functional specializations of the respective 
hemispheres as a means for inducing the respective 
processing styles (McElroy & Seta, 2004). 
 
The analytic/holistic model differs from other dual–processing 
models in how the two styles process information. The analytic 
system focuses on dismantling the information, breaking it down 
into distinct elements and then combining the information and 
focusing on quantitative weights for solutions. This type of processing 
is characteristic of how information is analyzed in the left 
hemisphere and leads individuals who are using this processing 
style to be especially reliant upon the expected value of the options 
and not on the way in which they are framed. Because both 
options in a risky–choice framing task have the same expected 
value (or numeric magnitude) ideally there should be no preference 
between the options. The expected value of an outcome, 
however, typically is not objective but rather subjective. There is 
often, for example, a premium placed on an outcome that will be 
obtained with certainty (e.g., Machina, 1982; Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1968). Thus, although the preference of individuals 
using an analytic processing style is resistant to the influence of a 
frame, it may still be influenced by the subjective value that 
individuals assign to the components of the decision problem, 
such as certainty. 
 
The holistic system relies upon cues from the environment for 
processing; making it especially sensitive to context. According to 
the analytic/holistic model, this system operates through a process 
known as “contextual referencing” (e.g., Brownell, Pincus, 
Blum, Rehak, & Winner, 1997). In contextual referencing, context 
cues elicit a cognitive framework within which the decision problem 
is interpreted and evaluated and is characteristic of how information 
is processed in the right hemisphere. Because this 
processing style relies heavily upon contextual cues (i.e., frames) 
individuals utilizing this processing style should be especially 
prone to the influence of the frame, appearing risk–averse for positive 
frames and risk–seeking for negative frames (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). 
 
 
 
 
 
RELATED TEMPORAL RESEARCH 
 
There is a wide array of evidence showing that events occurring at 
relatively closer temporal proximities are processed differently 
than events occurring in more distant proximities (Sanna & 
Chang, 2006). For example, Gilovich, Kerr, and Medvec (1993) 
measured participants’ confidence about their performance and 
found that confidence was markedly reduced from the beginning 
to the end of the semester. Sanna, Chang, Parks, and Carter (2005) 
investigated how “temporal framing” would influence the group 
planning fallacy. They found that when individuals were told 
that there was little time remaining on their task (close temporal 
proximity) the group planning fallacy was eliminated. There is 
also evidence that presenting events in more distant temporal 
proximity may attenuate a fallacy. Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu 
(2005) found that when events were presented in the distant future 
overreliance on alignable elements of the alternatives was reduced. 
Moreover, Sanna and Schwarz (2004) found that temporal 
factors can affect the accessibility of thoughts related to success or 
failure. 
 
Research investigating temporal construal theory has shown 
that when events are presented in the relatively distant future in- 
dividuals appear to make more global attributions, focusing on 
broader, superordinate implications (Liberman & Trope, 1998) 
and often construe the event in more abstract terms (Trope & 
Liberman, 2003). For example, in one recent study Liberman, 
Sagristano, and Trope (2002, Study 2) provided individuals with 
the task of evaluating the valence (good or bad) of a particular 
day. The day was presented as occurring in either the relatively 
distant or near future. They found that when the day was in the 
near future individuals reported more diversity in terms of the 
days valence. However, when the day was to occur in the distant 
future, there was less variance in the valence of the day which 
resulted in a more prototypical “good day” or “bad day.” 
 
Therefore, research investigating the effects of temporal proximity 
has found that when events are presented as occurring at 
more distant temporal proximities, individuals are more susceptible 
to fallacies (Sanna, Chang, Parks, & Carter, 2005), valenced 
information (Liberman, Sagristano,&Trope, 2002) and optimistic 
bias (Gilovich, Kerr, & Medvec, 1993) relative to when events are 
occurring at close temporal proximity. Although the aforementioned 
research did not directly investigate the relevance of a decision 
task, it does nonetheless provide evidence that temporal 
proximity of the event can lead to different processing strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
TEMPORAL PROCESSING AND FRAMING 
 
Research investigating temporal factors has not directly examined 
how temporal proximity will influence task relevance. However, 
we propose that events occurring at more distal temporal 
points will be perceived as less relevant whereas events occurring 
at more proximal points will be perceived as more relevant. We 
use this temporal relevance assumption to make predictions 
about when framing effects are likely to occur. 
 
According to the analytic/holistic model for framing (e.g., 
McElroy & Seta, 2003) the relevance of an event functions to determine 
which processing style will be induced and, consequently, 
the likelihood of framing effects. Therefore, because events occurring 
in close temporal proximity should be perceived as more relevant, 
they should also be processed using the more effortful, 
analytic processing style. Consequently, under these conditions, 
decision–makers should rely on the numeric magnitude of the alternatives 
and attenuated framing effects should occur. However, 
if the individual perceives the event as occurring in 
relatively distant temporal proximity they should perceive the 
event as less relevant and be more likely to use the less effortful, 
holistic processing style resulting in more robust framing effects. 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
 
We conducted three studies to examine the relationship between 
temporal proximity and the framing effect. First, we wanted to 
test our assumption that events occurring in closer temporal 
proximity are more relevant than events occurring at a more distant 
proximity. We designed Study 1 to directly assess this assumption 
in a risky–choice type decision task. Studies 2 and 3 
were designed to examine whether events occurring at different 
temporal proximities will elicit different processing styles and 
consequently, influence the likelihood of framing effects. In 
Study 2, we experimentally manipulated the future temporal distance 
at which the Asian disease was to occur and measured its effect 
on participants’ choice preference. In Study 3, we 
manipulated the temporal proximity of a risky–choice decision 
task involving cholesterol intake. We then measured participants’ 
choice preference and responses to a frame recall task to 
assess holistic processing. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants. The 40 participants in the study were undergraduate 
students at Appalachian State University who volunteered to 
participate. Of our participants, 29 were women and 11 were 
men. 
 
Procedure. After consenting to take part in our study, participants 
were presented with the stimuli material and asked to consider 
each of the questions. All of the participants were first given 
the introduction to the traditional Asian disease problem (seeAp- 
pendix 1). They were then asked to rate the relevance of the event 
if it were to be occurring at four different points in the future (one 
week, one year, three years, 30 years).1 A 10–point Likert scale 
ranging from 1(not relevant) to 10 (extremely relevant) was used 
to assess participants’ reported relevance. The order of the temporal 
points was counterbalanced between participants. After 
completion, participants were informed of the purpose of the 
study and thanked for their participation. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
We first calculated the average relevance scores for each of the 
temporal points. Participants reported a distinct pattern of relevance 
with the level of relevance decreasing as the event grew farther 
away in time (see Table 1). This pattern is consistent with our 
reasoning that events occurring in relatively closer temporal 
proximity are seen as more relevant than those occurring in more 
distant temporal proximity. To investigate these findings, weperformed 
a one–wayANOVAwith temporal proximity acting as independent 
variable, and participants reported relevance as our 
dependent variable. This analysis revealed a significant effect F 
(1, 148) = 29.95, p < .001. Further, a repeated measures analysis of 
our data revealed a very similar effect F (3, 37) = 26.73, p < .001. To 
further investigate this finding we performed contrasts for each 
of the increasing levels of temporal proximity. These analyses revealed 
significant increases in relevance from the week to year 
condition F (1, 148) = 8.08, p < .01, the 1–year to 3–year condition F 
(1, 148) = 10.14, p < .01 and 3–year to 30–year condition F (1, 148) = 
8.4, p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results from this study provide empirical evidence that 
events occurring closer in temporal proximity are seen as more 
relevant whereas those occurring in more distant temporal proximity 
are seen as less relevant. As substantial research has shown, 
more relevant events induce more effortful processing whereas 
less relevant events induce less effortful processing (e.g., 
Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Additionally, research 
has also shown that framing effects are very pronounced when 
less effortful processing is induced and attenuated when more 
effortful processing is induced (Leny–Meyers & Maheswaran, 
2004; McElroy & Seta, 2003; 2006). Therefore, based upon these 
findings, Experiment 2 was designed to test whether different 
temporal distances for the Asian disease problem would lead to 
different types of processing for a framing task and, in turn, 
differences in the strength of the framing effect. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants and Design. The study was made up of 344 undergraduate 
students; our sample consisted of 194 females and 150 
males. The design of our study consisted of a 2 frame (gain, loss) × 
4 temporal proximity (week, 1yr, 3yrs, 30yrs) between factors 
design. 
 
Procedure. After consenting to participate in our study, all participants 
were presented with the vignette of the Asian disease 
problem framed either as gains (saved) or losses (die). Imbedded 
within the vignette was the indicator of temporal proximity. Participants 
were presented with one of the four temporal proximity 
conditions. The different temporal conditions are presented 
parenthetically below: 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease. The disease is expected to hit in (a week, one year, three years, 
thirty years) and kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat 
the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates 
of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
 
Directly afterward, participants were provided with the traditional 
risk–free, risk–seeking choices. After participants had 
made their decision, they were debriefed, thanked for their participation, 
and dismissed from the study. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
We first wanted to test whether the typical gain/loss framing effect 
appeared across framing conditions. When we collapsed 
across temporal conditions, a strong framing effect was evident X2 
(1,N= 344) = 24.1, p > .0001. In order to examine our temporal–relevance 
hypothesis we wanted to test whether temporal proximity 
of the event influenced processing of the decision task and, in 
turn, influenced the frame. In order to examine this we performed 
an analysis to test for framing effects in each of the temporal distance 
conditions. As can be seen in Table 1, analysis of the 
one–week condition did not reveal a significant effect for 
gain/loss framing X2 (1,N= 86) = 2.9, p < 1. In the one year X2 (1,N 
= 86) = 4.7, p < .05 and three year condition X2 (1, N = 86) = 6.5, p < 
.01 however, significant framing effects were found. The data for 
the thirty–year condition revealed a very strong framing effect X2 
(1, N = 86) = 12.7, p > .0004. 
 
The results of this study provide some support for our temporal 
relevance hypothesis in that framing effects were found when the 
event was to occur at a relatively distant point in time (i.e., one 
year or three years) but not when it was to occur at a relative close 
point in time (i.e., one week). Furthermore, the framing effect was 
most pronounced when the event was expected to occur at the 
most distal point in time (i.e., 30 years). These results however, 
are relatively weak in that the difference between the strength of 
the framing effect in the one week condition did not differ significantly 
from the one (X2< 1), three (X2< 1) or thirty year condition X2 
(1, N = 172) = 2.6, p < . 11. It is interesting to note that although 
there was not a significant difference between the 30 week and 
one week conditions, there was a descriptive difference X2 (1, N = 
86) = 3.2, p < .08 between these two conditions when the problem 
was framed as a loss, but not as a gain X2 < 1. The relatively strong 
effect found in the loss frame may be due to differences in the relevance 
of the Asian disease to participants across these two different 
frames. Specifically, the negative implications of the Asian 
disease may have been more relevant to participants when the 
disease was imminent (i.e., one week) and framed as a loss compared 
to when it was imminent and framed as a gain. If so, then 
stronger effects would be expected when the problem was 
framed as a loss. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
Experiment 2 demonstrated some support for our hypothesis that 
because proximal events are more relevant than distal ones, they 
are processed more effortfully, leading to attenuated framing effects. 
The results of Experiment 2, however, were weak. Thus, we 
wanted to further examine our temporal relevance hypothesis. In 
Experiment 3, we again manipulated the temporal proximity of 
an event; one involving cholesterol levels. However, to increase 
power, we also made changes to our independent variable. Recall 
that in Experiment 2 the most “imminent” event was to occur in 
one week. In Experiment 3, we increased the immediacy of the 
event from one week to several hours. We also made changes to 
our dependent variable. In Experiment 2, we used a dichotomous 
choice measure. Participants were asked to choose between two 
different options. Dichotomous measures are typically less powerful 
than continuous ones. Thus, in Experiment 3, we used a 
7–point Likert scale where 1 indicated a definite preference for the 
risk–averse option and 7 indicated a definite preference for the 
risk–seeking option (Levin et al., 2002). Finally, we used a memory 
task to provide a relatively direct test for whether participants 
used different processing styles across the proximal and distal 
framing conditions. 
 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants and Design. The study was composed of 152 participants, 
75 females and 77 males. The design of our study included 
a 2 frame (success, fail) × 2 temporal proximity (hours, years) between– 
subjects factorial design. 
 
Stimulus Materials: Framing Task. In this experiment, we used a 
different scenario to manipulate temporal proximity. We chose a 
risky–choice decision task developed by Levin et al. (2002). This 
task was adapted for our temporal proximity manipulation by the 
addition of one of the temporal indicators; “in several years” or 
“in several hours” (see parenthetical notations in the introduction 
below). In this task, participants were provided with the 
following introduction: 
 
Imagine that one of your parents was diagnosed with having dangerously 
high levels of cholesterol and you are faced with choosing a treatment 
program (in several hours or in several years). Two programs 
have been developed for treating high levels of cholesterol. Assume that 
the following alternatives represent the exact estimates of the situation 
that you will be facing (in several hours or in several years). 
 
Afterward, they were presented with the following two alternatives 
framed either as gains or losses (losses condition presented 
in parentheses): 
 
If program A is adopted, two-thirds of the persons treated will succeed 
in reducing (fail to reduce) their cholesterol. 
 
If program B is adopted, there is a one-third chance that none of the persons 
treated will succeed in reducing (fail to reduce) their cholesterol 
and a two-thirds chance that all of the persons will succeed in reducing 
(fail to reduce) their cholesterol. 
 
Immediately afterwards, participants were asked to indicate their 
preference for the alternatives on a 7–point Likert scale where 1 
indicated “Definitely would recommend A” and 7 represented 
“Definitely would recommend B.” 
 
Holistic Assessment Task. According to the analytic/holistic 
model, when decision–makers process a decision task using the 
holistic style they engage in contextual referencing. In contextual 
referencing, context cues are sought from the problem that will 
lead the decision–maker to initiate a framework and the problem 
is then evaluated within this framework. Because this process is 
dependent upon context cues (in our situation the frame), decision– 
makers who are processing using the holistic style should 
have more elaborate, in–depth use of the frame. Consequently, 
they should have better recall for the problem’s frame. Conversely, 
individuals processing using the analytic style should be 
more sensitive to the numeric magnitude of the alternatives and 
have less in–depth processing of contextual elements (i.e., the 
frame). And as a result, they should perform more poorly when 
recalling the frame. Because our manipulation of “hours” was designed 
to induce the analytic style, we predict that in this condition 
individuals will be more prone to making errors when 
recalling the frame. And because the “years” condition was designed 
to induce the holistic style, individuals in this condition 
should have relatively better recall of the frame and make fewer 
errors in our assessment task. 
Because we wanted to assess participant’s ability to correctly 
recall the frame, we constructed a “posttest” of the decision alternatives 
to ascertain whether participants could accurately report 
the frame of the alternatives they had just evaluated. As presented 
in the example below, the frame is imbedded within the alternatives 
creating three “frame–choice” situations. Participants 
were asked to choose the correct alternative for each of the three 
options. 
 
(Please circle one) 
 
If program A is adopted, one-third of the persons treated will (fail or 
succeed) in reducing their cholesterol. 
 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third chance that all of the persons 
treated will (fail or succeed) and a two-thirds chance that none of 
the persons treated will (fail or succeed) in reducing their cholesterol. 
 
Procedure. Participants were seated in groups with an average of 
10 participants. They were briefly introduced to the experimenter 
and all participants agreed to participate. All participants were 
randomly assigned to the temporal proximity and framing conditions 
and presented with the cholesterol decision task. After completing 
the decision task, participants were asked to turn the 
material face down on the desk in front of them. They were then 
provided with our recall task designed to assess the extent of holistic 
processing. After completion of this material, participants 
were debriefed and released from the experiment. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 3 depicts the preference means for the decision alternatives 
across both temporal proximity and framing conditions. Consistent 
with our hypothesis, there appears to be a markedly strong 
framing effect in the temporally distal condition (years) and no effect 
for framing in the temporally proximal condition (hours). In 
order to assess the overall effect of our manipulations, we first 
performed a regression analysis with frame (success, fail) and 
temporal proximity (hours, years) as our independent variables 
and participants’ reported preference for the risk–averse and 
risk–seeking alternatives as our dependent variable. This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect for the problem framing F (1, 
148) = 4.19, p < .05 as well as a significant Frame × Temporal proximity 
interaction F (1, 148) = 5.6, p < .02. This interaction supports 
our predictions for relatively stronger framing effects in the more 
distant temporal condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
We then wanted to examine the framing effect in each of our 
temporal proximity conditions. In order to investigate this we 
performed paired contrasts on each of these conditions. This analysis 
revealed that when the framing situation was presented as 
occurring in close temporal proximity (several hours), the 
gain/loss framing manipulation produced no significant framing 
effect F < 1. However, when the framing situation was presented 
as occurring in relatively distant temporal proximity, a strong 
framing effect occurred F (1, 148) = 9.7, p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
A second aspect of our study was to examine possible evidence 
for holistic processing. The measure that we designed allowed us 
to assess individual participant’s recall of the framing manipulation. 
The findings from this recall task are presented in Table 4. 
Recall that, according to the analytic/holistic model, when an individual 
processes decisions in the holistic style they engage in 
contextual referencing. Acentral aspect of this process is that contextual 
cues are sought and then relied upon for subsequent processing. 
Therefore, it follows that individuals processing with this 
style should be more apt to correctly recall the frame because it 
was more thoroughly used in the decision–making process and 
should be more salient to them. To investigate this possibility we 
performed a repeated measures analysis with temporal proximity 
(hours, years) acting as our independent variable and participants 
correct/incorrect recall of the three frame responses as our 
dependent variable. This analysis revealed a significant effect for 
temporal proximity F (1, 150) = 3.9, p < .05. As may be seen in Table 
4, participants in the distant temporal condition (years) were 
more accurate in reporting the problem frame than participants in 
the more proximal condition (hours). This finding provides 
support for our contention that individuals processed holistically 
in the relatively distant temporal framing condition. 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
An inevitable part of any decision we face is that it will occur at 
some point in the future, be it near or far. In this paper, we examined 
how the temporal proximity of the event affected participants’ 
decisions for a risky–choice decision task. Based upon the 
analytic/holistic model, we predicted a temporal/relevance hypothesis 
for temporal proximity and framing effects. We reasoned 
that when an event is presented as occurring in relatively 
close temporal proximity, it will be perceived as especially relevant. 
Consequently, individuals should process the decision with 
the more effortful analytic style leading to attenuated framing ef- 
fects. When the event is expected to occur in the distant future, 
however, it should be relatively irrelevant and a holistic style of 
processing should be used, leading to pronounced framing 
effects. 
 
The results support this temporal/relevance hypothesis. In 
Study 1, events that were expected in the near future were seen as 
more relevant that those that were not expected until the distant 
future. In Study 2, we manipulated the temporal proximity of the 
widely tested Asian disease problem whereas in Study 3, we manipulated 
a different type of decision problem involving cholesterol 
treatment. Overall, the results provide support for our 
contention that framing effects will be attenuated when the event 
is expected to occur in relatively close temporal proximity. 
 
Overall, our findings provide more insight into the underlying 
processes involved in a risky–choice framing task. Specifically, 
one aspect of the event in question, temporal proximity, affects 
how the decision alternatives are processed and the style of processing 
invoked will influence reliance on either the frame or numeric 
magnitude of the alternatives. 
 
 
Our findings highlight the need to consider contextual factors, 
including temporal proximity, which may influence the decision– 
making process. Prior research has identified other contextual 
factors that influence the decision process. For example, 
researchers have identified how the “arena” or situational aspects 
of the task may influence subsequent decisions. In one study, 
Fagley and Miller (1997) found that tasks involving human lives 
produced framing effects whereas tasks involving money did 
not. Similar findings by Schneider (1992) revealed that tasks presented 
in different situations invoke different levels of aspiration 
that in turn, influence the likelihood of framing. Further, Wang, 
Simons, and Brédart (2001) found that familial relationship to the 
target of the task (level of kinship) influenced the likelihood of 
framing effects. Taken together, we believe that the contextual 
presentation of the alternatives effects subsequent reliance on the 
frame. We present one aspect of the context, temporal proximity, 
that will affect processing and reliance on the decision frame. Accounting 
for these contextual factors should lead to a better 
picture of the decision–making process in future framing 
research. 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
An interesting question for future research would be to examine 
how the event within the task (e.g., Asian disease, cholesterol 
treatment) may influence time imposition. Our pilot study revealed 
that the Asian disease had a great deal of variability for 
participants’ estimates of when they expected it to occur, with an 
average of several years. It may be the case that some events are 
expected to be relatively close or relatively distant in temporal 
proximity. Generalizing from the results of our studies, this time 
imposition may make it more or less likely for framing effects to 
emerge in these different scenarios. This finding could account 
for some of the discrepant findings across the different arenas of 
task presentation (e.g., Bloomfield, 2006; Fagley & Miller, 1997; 
Kühberger, 1998; Schneider, 1992). 
 
As can be seen in Table 4, all three of the frame–recall opportunities 
produced more incorrect responses for hours than years. 
However, the first recall question appears to carry a majority of 
the influence. This finding suggests a type of primacy effect for 
the frame recall in holistic processing. While this is speculative, it 
does present an interesting question for future research. 
Also, recent research investigating the influence of alignable 
and nonalignable differences in choice options provides an interesting 
contrast for our results and future research. This research 
originates from early work by Tversky (1977) and later Structural 
Alignment theory (see for review Genter & Markman, 1997). The 
primary focus of this research is whether decision–makers rely 
upon elements of the decision options that are present in each option 
(alignability) or elements not present in every option 
(nonalignability). In a series of studies, Zhang and Markman 
(2001) investigated how motivation influenced decision–makers 
reliance upon alignable vs. non–alignable elements. They found 
that when individuals where motivated in a task they tended to 
rely more upon non–alignable elements whereas they relied upon 
alignable elements when they were low in motivation. 
 
More recent research has investigated how temporal factors 
may influence reliance upon alignable vs. nonalignable elements. 
Studies by Malkoc et al. (2005) examined alignability/ 
nonalignability reliance in light of temporal construal theory. 
They found that when a decision task was presented in the more 
distant future, decision–makers relied more upon nonalignable 
elements of the options whereas when the task was presented as 
occurring in the near future they relied more upon alignable 
elements. 
 
It would seem that in a typical risky–choice framing task, elements 
of the frame (lives saved or people die) should be alignable 
elements of the choices. Consistent with the findings of Zhang 
and Markman (2001), we found that under high motivation (relevance) 
individuals relied less on the frame whereas under low 
motivation (relevance) they did consider the frame more. Different 
from Malkoc et al. (2005), we found that when decision–makers 
evaluated events occurring in the more distant future, they 
relied more upon alignable elements of the decision choice (i.e., 
the frame) and they appear to rely upon nonalignable elements 
when the event is to occur in the near future. 
 
While our studies were not designed to ascertain alignability/ 
nonalignability reliance, these findings provide an interesting 
comparison. One appears supportive while the other seems contradictory. 
Reconciliation for this apparent discrepancy may be 
found in examining questions such as whether analytic information 
can be perceived as an alignable element of the task or 
whether the goals of the task may encourage one form of reliance 
as being superior to the other. Specifically, it may be the case that 
the goal of the task (e.g., increase or decrease) may influence 
whether individuals tend to rely upon alignable or nonalignable 
elements. Future research should attempt to address these types 
of questions with a task more specifically designed for these 
concerns. 
 
 
 
NOTE 
1. These temporal points were determined by pilot testing. Because we wanted to maintain a 
realistic time frame for the events occurrence we asked a separate group of 111 participants to 
estimate when they believed the Asian disease would occur. The conditions in this study 
represent the mean and mode as well as the high and low range obtained from our question of 
temporal estimation for the Asian disease occurrence. 
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